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In current debates regarding the future of education, teacher compensation schemes are often 
criticized for their lack of performance-based pay. Proponents of merit pay for teachers argue 
that tying teacher salaries to student achievement will induce teachers to focus on the success of 
their students and stimulate innovation in the school system as a whole. In this paper, we use a 
randomized policy experiment conducted in the New York City public school system to explore 
the effects of one group-based pay scheme. We investigate potential impacts of incentive pay 
over two academic years (2007-2008 and 2008-2009) on student performance on annual math 
and reading exams, teacher absences, and responses to environmental surveys of teachers and 
students. We also consider whether the program had differential outcomes on groups within 
schools that were especially likely to be targeted, given the particular incentive structure of the 
program. Last, we explore relative impacts on the market for teachers by examining end-of-year 
teacher turnover and the quality composition of newly hired teachers. In general, we find no 
significant effects of this program. However, there is some evidence that the program reduced 
teacher absenteeism in schools with a small number of teachers, and that these effects were 
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1. Introduction 
 Teacher compensation schemes are often criticized for their lack of performance pay and 
relatively low pay in general. Critics claim that these features of teachers’ salaries can lead to 
sorting and adverse selection in the market for teachers. Proponents of merit pay argue that tying 
teacher salaries to student achievement will induce teachers to focus on the success of their 
students and stimulate innovation in the school system as a whole, leading to enhanced 
efficiency in the public education system. In other sectors, incentive systems are used to extract 
efficient output from workers.1 Pay contingent on individual performance can be valuable in a 
setting where employers are able to measure and reward on-the-job performance. However, 
education is a complex good and it is difficult to observe and appropriately monitor the behavior 
of educators and their respective contributions to the production of education. Thus, designing an 
incentive system compatible with our educational goals may be difficult. 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of group-based incentive pay for teachers using a 
policy experiment conducted in New York City. In the fall of 2007, 185 schools were randomly 
selected from a pool of high-poverty schools to be eligible for school-level bonuses based 
primarily on student exam results.2 We examine the impacts this program had on student 
performance on math and reading exams in the first and second years following program 
implementation, teacher effort (as measured by absence rates), and outcomes from surveys of 
teachers and students, including changes in classroom activities and school-level policies. We 
find no significant impact of the bonus program on student achievement in the first or second 
year of the program. Nor do we find any overall impact on teacher absences or changes in 
policies such as the availability of tutoring or teachers’ use of student achievement data in lesson 
planning in the program’s first year.  
An individual teacher’s ability to affect the probability of receiving a bonus is decreasing 
in the number of teachers with tested students; thus, free-riding may have dampened the 
incentive effects of the bonus program. We examine whether this is the case by testing for an 
                                                 
1 See Macleod and Parent (1999) for an overview of other sectors that employ incentive-based pay. These 
compensation schemes are generally most effective in sales jobs and those that involve operating machines. 
Incentive pay is less commonly used and generally less effective in sectors where output is more difficult to 
measure.  
2 The program also included 39 high-poverty secondary schools.  Since the measurable outcomes are different for 
high schools, we concentrate our analysis on elementary and middle schools and schools serving children in 
kindergarten through 8th grade (K-8 schools).   
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interaction of the bonus program with the number of teachers with tested students in a school. 
We find no evidence of an important free-rider effect on student achievement or school policies.  
However, we find some evidence that teachers of tested subjects responded to the program by 
reducing absences, but only in schools with relatively of these teachers.  
The structure of the bonus program also contained incentives to target specific subgroups 
of students, including those at the bottom of the achievement distribution. Despite this incentive, 
we find some evidence that students with low prior achievement were negatively impacted by the 
program. Finally, we examine the impact the program had on teacher turnover and the 
characteristics of newly hired teachers after the first year of the program.  We find no evidence 
that the bonus program reduced teacher turnover or improved the qualifications (e.g., prior 
experience, certification) of new hires. 
We provide an overview of the bonus program in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the 
difficulties and theoretical implications associated with implementing merit-based pay in 
schools.  Section 4 provides an overview of the data and outlines our empirical framework, 
Section 5 presents results, and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The New York City School-Wide Bonus Program  
In the school year 2007-2008, the New York City Department of Education (DOE) 
established the “School-Wide Bonus Program” (hereafter, the bonus program), under an 
agreement with the local teachers’ union, the United Federation of Teachers (UFT). The DOE 
randomly selected 185 schools serving kindergarten through eighth grade from a group of 
schools designated as “high need.” These schools were then eligible to participate contingent on 
a majority vote in favor of the program.3  Teachers in participating schools could receive a lump-
sum bonus if the school met goals based primarily on student achievement.  
Schools that achieved a target score or were awarded an “A” accountability grade 
(explained below) received a pool of bonus money equal to $3,000 per union teacher, while 
schools that fell short but managed to meet 75 percent of the target score received a pool of 
bonus money equal to $1,500 per union teacher. Bonuses were distributed across teachers 
                                                 
3 In order to participate, 55 percent of full-time United Federation of Teachers (UFT) staff in the school needed to 
vote in favor of the program. A school’s principal was also given participation veto power. A total of 25 schools 
(14% of all eligible schools) did not approve the program.   
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according to a formula designed by each school’s compensation committee, comprised of the 
principal and two representatives from the teacher’s union. The distribution formula was chosen 
after the student exam period. In a school where the bonus payment was equally distributed 
across teachers, the full $3,000 award represents a 7 percent increase in the salary of teachers at 
the bottom of the pay scale and a 3 percent increase for those at the top.4 
The timing of program announcement and the selection of schools into the treatment 
group did not allow much leeway for behavioral responses to the program in its first year.  
Selection into the program and the vote to participate took place in November 2007, less than 
two months before reading exams were taken in January and less than four months before math 
exams were taken in March. However, the program continued in the school year 2008-2009, and 
all schools in the program voted to participate in the second year.5 Of the 160 treatment schools 
that voted to participate in the first year of the program, 89 (56 percent) received bonus 
payments.  The bonus pool averaged $160,095 per school, and amounted to a total of $14.2 
million district-wide. Bonus payments for the second year of the program have not yet been 
distributed.  
The school year 2007-2008 also marked the implementation of the DOE’s new 
accountability system, under which schools received progress reports and accountability grades 
designed to summarize a school’s overall performance on a multidimensional metric of student 
learning.6 Each school’s performance was scored relative to the entire district and to a group of 
“peer schools,” with similar student demographic characteristics or prior test scores.7 Each 
school’s progress report documented its score on this metric, the corresponding accountability 
grade, and a target score for the following school year. Schools that received lower 
accountability grades needed to achieve greater gains to reach their target scores.  
                                                 
4 Teacher salary schedules are available at http://www.uft.org/member/contracts/moa/salary_schedules 
5 Four schools participating in the program were closed at the end of the school year 2007-2008, thus 181 schools 
participated in 2008-2009.  
6 The metric was calculated from measures of school environment (results of a learning environment survey and 
student attendance), student performance (average student achievement on reading and math exams, median 
proficiency, and percentage students achieving proficiency), student progress (average change and percent making 
progress on math and reading exams), and extra credit for exemplary student progress among high-need students. 
7 For elementary schools and those serving kindergarten through eighth grade (K-8), the index was based on a 
function of the percentage of students that were English language learner (ELL), special education, Title I free 
lunch, and minority. For middle schools, the peer index was based on the 4th grade reading and math test scores of 
current students. These different constructions actually encapsulate consistent metrics for relative disadvantage, as 
the components for the elementary/K-8 peer index are very strong predictors of 4th grade test scores.  Therefore, the 
two methods should yield reasonably close measures. 
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The details of the accountability system are important for our analysis: schools were 
selected into the experimental sample based on their peer indices, and teacher bonuses were 
awarded based on whether a school was able to achieve its target score. Furthermore, the 
accountability system provided additional incentives to schools participating in the bonus 
program. Schools that earned an A or B accountability grade received rewards (e.g., principal 
bonuses, additional funds based on students transferring from schools receiving a poor grade), 
while schools that received D and F grades faced consequences (e.g., risk of school closure and 
removal of principal).  Estimates of the effects of the citywide accountability system suggest that 
receiving an F or D had significant and positive impacts on test scores (Rockoff and Turner, 
2008). It is important to note that our results estimate the interaction of bonus program and the 
NYC accountability system; they may be interpreted as the impact of teacher group performance 
pay in a district where there is already an accountability system providing incentives to schools.  
 
3. Incentive Pay and Teacher Effort 
Allowing compensation to vary with output can align workers’ incentives with those of 
the employer, highlighting specific aspects of an employee’s job that are the most valued. When 
a job involves several tasks or when the nature of such tasks are broadly defined, incentive pay 
can help resolve confusion as to how best to fulfill responsibilities. Additionally, properly-
structured performance pay can offset shirking behavior and encourage employees to provide 
costly effort.8  If at least some public school teachers exert an inefficiently-low amount of effort 
or focus their effort on tasks where the marginal returns for society are too low, then merit pay 
may be desirable. Teachers could respond to incentive payments by increasing effort along 
several margins; for instance, spending more time on lesson preparation, showing up to school 
more often, or spending extra time helping students outside of normal class hours.9  
However, performance pay in the educational sector may not be as effective as it is in 
other occupations. Education is a complex good: teachers must complete multidimensional tasks 
and allocate their effort across several activities.  Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) demonstrate 
                                                 
8 Effort extraction is just one motivation for incentive-based pay.  Incentive systems arise for other reasons as well, 
such as better sorting of workers across jobs or in order to select quantity versus quality of output (Lazear, 1986). 
9 It need not be the case that these teaching activities immediately translate into higher test scores. Rather, it is only 
necessary that teachers themselves believe that these behaviors are correlated with student achievement. However, 
over time, we might expect to see persistent or increased use of teaching practices that were successful in the short 
run and a decrease in the use of those that were not. 
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that the performance metric to which compensation is tied affects how effort is allocated.  
Therefore, in designing a system that rewards teachers for performance, two aspects of the 
design require careful thought: the performance measure used to evaluate performance and 
teachers’ potential responses. While test scores provide a measure of educational output, tying 
performance pay to testing outcomes may cause teachers to focus on narrowly-defined skills that 
appear on exams (e.g., “teaching to the test”) or overtly manipulate test scores (e.g., Levitt and 
Jacob, 2003; Jacob, 2005; Figlio, 2006; Figlio and Getzler, 2006; Cullen and Reback, 2006).  
 
3.1 Previous Results on Teacher Incentives  
Current systems of performance pay for teachers range anywhere from competitive 
bonuses drawn from a fixed pot, where the teacher whose classroom or school experiences the 
greatest gains receives an award (e.g., Florida’s 2006-2007 Special Teachers Are Rewarded 
(STAR) program), to bonuses tied to fixed achievement thresholds (e.g., Mexico’s Carrera 
Magisterial program), and from direct incentives awarding bonuses to individual teachers (e.g., 
Denver’s ProComp program) to group-based incentives (e.g., North Carolina’s ABCs of Public 
Education program), where bonus payments are contingent on school- or district-wide 
performance. The specifics of how awards are allocated, the size of potential bonuses, and the 
metrics on which bonuses are based are all important.10  
The empirical literature on teacher performance pay is relatively new, and has grown as 
innovative compensation schemes have emerged.  Figlio and Kenny (2007) present evidence of a 
positive cross-sectional relationship between individual-based teacher performance pay and 
student achievement in U.S. schools. Systems where awards were difficult to earn and only a 
small number of teachers received incentive payments were most strongly related to student 
achievement. Experimental evidence on individual teacher incentives in Israel is consistent with 
these findings (Lavy, 2004). In Lavy’s study, teachers were awarded cash prizes for the 
performance of their class relative to other classes in the same subject. The incentive payments, 
ranging from 6 to 30 percent of teachers’ average annual salary, led to an increase in both the 
proportion of students taking a high school exit exam and the performance among test-takers. 
                                                 
10 For example, Neal (2008) discusses the necessary conditions and considerations for constructing an optimal 
incentive pay system for educators.  Even under optimal circumstances (e.g. an assessment exists for every academic 
skill with perfect reliability), a functional bonus-pay system requires both "a method for ranking schools or teachers 
according to performance" and "the assignment of specific rewards and penalties to the various performance ranks 
that schools or teachers may receive." 
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These student achievement gains likely stemmed from an increase in after-school sessions, 
evidence of increased teacher effort in response to potential rewards.  Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman (2008) also find a large positive impact of individual teacher incentives using a 
randomized experiment in India.  These effects were present across different grades levels and 
student competency levels, and the gains made by students persisted through a second year of 
testing.  
There is less evidence on the effectiveness of group-based teacher incentives. In theory, 
group incentive payments will be the most effective when the production technology is truly 
joint, and there is some evidence that teachers’ productivity is affected by the productivity of 
their peers (Jackson and Bruegmann, 2009). However, group incentives may dilute a given 
teacher’s marginal benefit to increasing effort, and free-riding among group members may result. 
Glewwe et al. (2003) examine the effects of a school-based teacher incentive experiment in rural 
Kenya, where teachers in grades 4 to 8 received a fixed bonus if their school had the highest 
score within the district or the largest improvement based on performance in a baseline year.  
The authors find evidence of short-term improvements in test scores but no long-term gains. 
Lavy (2002) finds that incentive payments based on school-wide performance increased student 
test scores and participation on matriculation exams in Israel, but the percentage of students who 
received matriculation certificates, arguably the longer-run outcome of interest, was unchanged.  
Notably, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2008) also examine group based incentives, and find 
similar increases in student achievement as with the individual incentive program.  However, it is 
important to note that the Indian schools in their sample typically contained only a few teachers, 
mitigating the free-rider problem. 
 
4. Data and Descriptive Results 
 Data on schools’ test scores and information related to the accountability system were 
collected from publicly available files on the DOE website.11 Our measures of academic 
achievement are average math and reading test scores for each school for the school years 2006-
2007, 2007-2008, and 2008-2009 (hereafter 2007, 2008, and 2009). We use information on each 
school’s performance under the new NYC accountability system, including each school’s 
                                                 
11 See http://schools.nyc.gov/Accountability/DOEData/default.htm for more details. 
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accountability grade, target score, and peer index.12  Lists of schools participating in the bonus 
program and eligible schools that voted to not participate in the program are also available 
online.13 
 Our treatment group is includes the 185 schools classified as elementary, middle, and K-8 
(schools serving kindergarten through 8th grade) that were eligible for the program. Of these 
schools, 25 schools voted not to participate. While we do not have information on which schools 
were potentially eligible but not randomly selected into the treatment group, we do know that all 
treatment schools were drawn from a group of “high needs” schools with the lowest peer index 
scores in the city. Thus, we can use treatment schools’ peer indices to construct a group of likely 
control schools. Specifically, we calculate the maximum peer index for each type of school 
(elementary, middle, K-8) in the treatment group, and assume that all schools below these cut-
offs that were not assigned to the treatment group are control schools. Using this methodology, 
our control group contains 162 schools. 
We also use school-level information from annual surveys of teachers and students 
conducted by the DOE as part of the accountability system near the end of the school year. From 
these surveys, we construct a group of variables designed to measure teachers’ perceptions of 
school-wide changes and students’ reports of classroom activities. Specifically, we use the 
questions from the student survey on the degree to which: 1) students completed essays and 
research projects, and 2) classroom activities included group work, class discussions, and 
“hands-on activities such as science experiments.”  We also measure the availability of tutoring, 
using students’ responses to questions on whether tutoring was offered before or after school or 
during free-periods. From the teacher survey, we construct measures of changes in school-wide 
policies. For instance, administrators could respond to the program by offering teachers 
additional professional development opportunities. To examine changes of this sort, we use 
questions on teachers’ use of achievement data, such as students’ test results from prior years or 
“periodic examinations” during the school year, to inform their lesson planning, and their views 
                                                 
12 Middle schools and elementary/K-8 schools have different metrics underlying their respective peer indices that 
also have different scales. Thus, for descriptive purposes, we standardize each type of school’s peer index to have a 
mean of zero and standard deviation of 1.  
13 The list of participating schools is available online at 
http://schools.nyc.gov/Accountability/RewardsandConsequences/PrincipalsBonusAnalysis/default.htm).  A list of 
eligible schools that did not vote to participate is available online at: 
http://www.uft.org/news/issues/press/bonus_vote. Although it does not affect our analysis, it is worth noting that 
one school appears on both lists. 
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on the quality of professional development offered. We also create a measure of whether 
teachers believed students faced high standards and expectations.  
 We aggregate data from individual students and teachers to examine whether students 
with particular characteristics experience greater-than-expected gains, given the incentives 
provided by the accountability system, and whether the program had any effect on teacher 
absences, a measure of teacher effort.14 We restrict our attention to absences classified as “self-
treated” illnesses and personal days, since absences for other reasons (e.g., severe illness, jury 
duty, military service, funeral, etc.) are unlikely to be affected by teachers’ effort decisions. 
Additionally, we use aggregated teacher data to test whether the bonus program had an effect on 
teacher turnover or the characteristics of newly-hired teachers. Finally, we use data on the 
number of teachers within each school providing instruction in the tested subjects and grades to 
test for the effects of free-riding.   
 When evaluating any intervention within an experimental setting, it is important to 
determine random selection successfully balanced observable characteristics of treatment and 
control group schools.  Table 1 compares the characteristics of treatment and control schools 
prior to selection into the treatment group.15 Treatment and control schools are similar in terms 
of enrollment, accountability outcomes, and student demographics, although teachers in 
treatment schools were significantly more likely to hold a master’s degree and also, on average, 
had significantly higher absence rates.   
However, it is more troubling that treatment schools had significantly higher test scores 
in both math and reading in 2007, while control schools experienced significantly greater gains 
in reading scores between 2006 and 2007. We address the first concern by including a control for 
the outcome of interest in the year prior to the intervention in all specifications (discussed in 
more detail in the next section). To address the second concern, we examine trends in test scores 
between the school years 2004-2005 and 2006-2007 to determine whether the growth in test 
scores differed between these two groups in prior years. If this was the case, we might be 
concerned that any estimated treatment effect was actually picking up differences in test score 
                                                 
14 These data are not public, but researchers can apply to use them with the approval of the DOE. 
15 Appendix Table I compares the characteristics of treatment schools by whether or not they voted to participate in 
the program. Schools voting “no” are largely similar to schools that actually received the treatment, although these 
25 schools were relatively less disadvantaged and had higher test scores on average. 
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trends. However, we find that treatment and control schools display quite similar trends (results 
available upon request).16  
 
5. Regression Framework  
 The advantage of a randomized experiment in estimating the effect of teacher incentives 
is that we can apply a very simple regression specification: 
Yjt= Djt + εjt, 
where Yjt is the outcome of interest for school j in year t (for example, average math scores in 
2008), εjt is a stochastic error component, and Djt is an indicator variable for whether the teachers 
within the school are in the treatment group. The identifying assumption of this approach 
requires that there be no contemporaneous shock that differentially affects the outcomes of the 
treatment schools in the same period as the treatment.   
 However, as shown in Table 1, we find some evidence that, even under random 
assignment, the treatment and controls schools differed on a few key characteristics, such as 
previous average test scores.  Therefore, our primary regression framework takes the following 
form:  
Yjt = Djt + Yjt-1 + εjt 
where  is the coefficient of interest. We control for the outcome in the year prior to the 
intervention to address any baseline differences between treatment and control schools. We 
estimate the equation with ordinary least squares, weighting by group size (e.g., number of 
students tested when the dependent variable is average math scores, number of teacher survey 
respondents for teacher survey outcomes). Because our treatment group includes schools that 
were eligible for the bonus program but voted not to participate, our results should be interpreted 
as the impact of offering the program to schools.  Since almost 90 percent of eligible schools 
                                                 
16 Table 1 also compares the characteristics of the experimental sample to other schools in New York City serving 
students in kindergarten through eighth grade that received accountability grades, were not charter schools, and did 
not only serve special education students. Given that eligible schools were selected based on having a peer index, it 
is not surprising that the experimental sample differed from the remainder of NYC schools across a number of 
dimensions. On average, schools in the experimental sample had a higher proportion of English Language Learners 
(ELL), special education students, minority students, and students eligible for the Title I free lunch program, as well 
as lower average math and reading scores.  Teachers in the experimental sample had slightly less experience and 
more absences, and experimental schools were smaller, with lower enrollment and fewer teachers. 
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voted to participate, the “treatment-on-treated” estimate of actually participating in the program 
would be roughly 15 percent larger in absolute value. 
 We also estimate a second specification that includes a vector of control variables to 
increase precision. These controls include school type (i.e., elementary, middle, or K-8), 
demographic composition (i.e., percentage of students that are ELL, special education, free 
lunch, and minority), peer index, and accountability score (since this determines a school’s target 
score).  Finally, we estimate a third specification that drops schools in the bottom 5 percent of 
the peer index.  This serves as a robustness check for our other estimates since there is a long tail 
at the bottom of the peer index distribution, which includes two control schools that are extreme 
outliers.   
  
6. Results  
 To preview our estimates of the impact of the bonus program on student achievement, we 
display the distribution of average math and reading scores within treatment and control schools 
in 2007, 2008, and 2009 (Figures 1 and 2). On average, all schools in the experimental sample 
experienced an increase in average student performance in the two years following the 
implementation of the program (as was true of other schools in NYC). If the bonus program had 
an impact on test scores, we should observe a shift in the distribution among treatment schools, 
relative to control schools. However, there are no obvious differences in the distribution of test 
scores in either subject after the baseline year.  
Table 2, which displays the regression results estimating the impact of the program on 
average exam scores, confirms these findings. Columns 1 and 4 contain estimates of the effect of 
program eligibility on average math and reading test scores, controlling for achievement in the 
prior year and weighted by the number of students tested. We do not observe any significant 
impacts on aggregate school performance in either the first or second year of the program, and 
the point estimates are all negative and quite small.17 Results do not noticeably change if we 
include school-level controls or drop outliers. While one might not expect to observe any effects 
                                                 
17 In 2008, the student level standard deviations of math and reading scores were 39 and 34 points, respectively 
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in the initial year, the fact that the estimates are very similar in the second year of the program 
suggests the program had no impact on student achievement.18  
Treatment schools face different incentives according to their accountability grades. 
Since schools that received an A on their progress report needed only to maintain this grade, the 
bonus program may not have provided a large incentive to teachers in these treatment schools to 
change their behavior. Conversely, both treatment and control schools receiving low grades had 
additional motivation to improve student test scores, as they faced closure or principal removal if 
student achievement did not improve in the following year. We investigate whether there is 
heterogeneity in schools’ responsiveness to treatment along this dimension, grouping schools 
into three separate bins by their accountability grades: A, B/C, and D/F. Our estimates become 
quite noisy, likely due to the small sample size within each grade-grouping, but are consistent 
with those discussed above: point estimates are small, we find no significant treatment effects in 
any group, and we cannot reject equality of effects across the three groups (results available upon 
request).  
 
6.1 Student and Teacher Survey Results 
It is possible that teachers and school administrators responded to the bonus program, but 
that these behavioral changes did not translate into increased student achievement. Thus, we 
explore whether the bonus program led to changes in teacher behavior and school policy using 
results from the DOE’s annual surveys of teachers and students. 19 We test whether the program 
induced any changes in classroom activities by examining the extent to which students reported 
working on “essays or projects” and “group work or hands-on activities.” We also test whether 
the program increased opportunities for before- or after-school tutoring sessions. Since only 
students in grades six or higher completed the survey, we lose a number of our schools, mostly at 
the elementary level. We do not find significant effects of treatment on student reports of 
participating in group or hands-on learning activities or on whether they completed projects or 
essays in class, although both of these outcomes are negatively correlated with treatment and, in 
the third specification, the latter measure comes close to conventional significance levels (Table 
                                                 
18 Four schools in the treatment group were closed at the end of the 2008 school year, thus, our sample decreases by 
eight observations for the second set of regressions. Our 2008 results remain unchanged when we restrict the sample 
to exclude these observations.  
19 For ease of interpreting results, all survey outcomes are standardized within school type to have a mean of zero 
and standard deviation of one across all NYC schools. 
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3, Panel A). Additionally, the bonus program appears to have little impact on the availability of 
tutoring.  
 Although the bonus program targets teachers, one might also expect it to induce changes 
in school-wide decisions. However, we do not find evidence of institutional responses to the 
intervention (Table 3, Panel B). There are no significant treatment effects on teachers’ use of 
student data or the quality of professional development received, and the point estimates of the 
impact of treatment on these outcomes are quite small. The final measure from the teacher 
survey we examine – whether teachers believed students in their school were held to high 
expectations – is negative and approaches conventional significance levels in the second and 
third specifications. If anything, these results indicate that the bonus program may have 
weakened standards for students.  
 
6.2 Teacher Effort and the Free-Rider Problem 
 Although we cannot directly examine many of the dimensions on which the bonus 
program may have led to higher effort provision on the part of teachers, we can measure whether 
teachers in treatment schools reduced absences. Absences are more common among teachers 
than in other occupations, and absenteeism has been shown to have a negative effect on student 
achievement (Clotfelter et al., 2009; Miller et al., 2008). Using data on absences among New 
York City teachers, Herrmann and Rockoff (2009) estimate that an additional 10 teacher 
absences results in a 0.01 standard deviation reduction in test scores.  
To explore whether the bonus program had an impact on teacher attendance, we run a 
series of regressions where the dependent variable is average absences between the months of 
November 2007, when schools first learned of their eligibility for the bonus program, and March 
2008, when the last exams were taken (Table 4).20  We also separately examine absences among 
teachers with tested students (e.g., teachers for grades 3 through 5 in elementary schools and 
math and reading teachers in middle schools). We only consider absences taken for illness and 
personal business. We exclude days missed due to death in the family, injury, jury duty, absences 
required by the school system (e.g., for professional development activities), conference 
                                                 
20 Since treatment schools did not vote until November, 2007, it does not make sense to include earlier absences.  If 
teachers did not expect the bonus program to continue beyond its first year, then the incentives should be weaker 
following the end of student testing.   
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attendance, and religious holidays because these are largely outside the teachers’ control.21 The 
first three columns of Table 4 show little effect of the bonus program on average absences, both 
among all teachers and among teachers with tested students.  
Theory predicts that incentives are weaker when the number of teachers who can directly 
affect whether a school receives the bonus increases. In the case of the bonus program, the 
teachers whose effort can directly affect the probability that a school qualifies for the bonus 
payments are those with tested students. Thus, we examine whether treatment effects are related 
to the number of teachers with tested students.22 We first de-mean our measure of the number of 
such teachers, and then include an interaction with the indicator for treatment; thus, the point 
estimate for the treatment indicator can be interpreted as the effect for the school with an average 
number of teachers with tested students (Table 5, columns (4) through (6)). A negative 
coefficient on the interaction between number of teachers and treatment would provide evidence 
that the program impacts are diluted by free-riding.  
Using estimates from the most conservative specification (column (5)), these results 
suggest that for schools with fewer than 8 teachers in tested classrooms (schools in the lowest 
quartile of this variable), the bonus program reduced absences by 0.2 days per teacher, which 
translates into 1.6 fewer absences over the five month period we examine. Considering the 
estimates of Herrmann and Rockoff (2009), it is not surprising that we do not see a 
corresponding increase in achievement even if we allow the effects of the bonus program to vary 
by the number of teachers in tested classrooms (results available upon request); their estimates 
would suggest this reduction in absences would translate into a 0.002 standard deviation 
improvement in test scores.  
 
6.3 Targeting 
 Although the bonus program had no observable impact on average student achievement, 
tying bonuses to the structure of the NYC accountability system provided incentives for schools 
to focus on students at the bottom of the achievement distribution. Therefore, a measure of 
central tendency, such as mean student achievement, may not fully capture the potential impacts 
                                                 
21 In support of this notion, absences for illness and personal days are more likely to occur on Mondays and Fridays 
than other types of absences. 
22 A small number of middle and K-8 schools do not have information on the number of teachers teaching tested 
subjects, thus, these schools are not included in regressions where the dependent variable is absences among 
teachers with tested students.  
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of the program. In line with recent research examining the effect of accountability systems on 
performance among different student subgroups (Cullen and Reback, 2002; Figlio and Getzler, 
2002; Figlio, 2006), we test whether the bonus program led to greater-than-expected 
achievement gains among particular students whose performance was given greater weight in 
determining the school's score. Although the NYC accountability system’s methodology for 
scoring schools is fairly complex, it still contains clear incentives to focus on some students more 
than others.  The accountability system awards schools more “points” for the performance of 
students whose prior-year achievement placed them in the lowest third of their grade, either 
within their school or within the entire city, those students on the cusp of proficiency and close to 
the school median (because a school receive points for students making proficiency and for its 
median score), and for the performance of ELL and special education students.  In short, the 
design of the accountability system creates additional incentives to target students other than 
those with the highest propensity to do well. 23 
 To examine whether the treatment led to greater achievement gains for some groups of 
students, we examine average test scores of four mutually exclusive groups: students in each 
third of the distribution of prior year test scores (making three groups), and students who were 
classified as receiving either ELL services or as special education students. Since students 
entering third grade will not have prior year test scores, we exclude these students from our 
sample. Each school-group cell forms a unit of observation and all regressions are weighted by 
the number of students in the cell with standard errors clustered at the school-level. When we 
include student characteristics as covariates, these are also calculated within each school-group 
cell. Table 5 presents these results using a model where the indicator for group is fully interacted 
with the treatment indicator, and the treatment indicator itself is dropped from the regression. We 
find no evidence that the math scores of students in the groups given more weight in the 
accountability system were differentially affected by program eligibility.  Indeed, the interaction 
with being in lowest third of achievement is negative and marginally significant. 
 
 
                                                 
23 Schools might also respond by reclassifying higher performing students as either ELL or special education to take 
advantage of the increased weight placed on these students’ scores. We do not find that the proportion of tested 
students classified as ELL or special education within treatment schools increased relative to control schools 
(Appendix Table A2). 
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6.4 Teacher Characteristics and Turnover 
Finally, we investigate whether the program bonus program led to changes in the 
qualifications of new teachers and the rate of teacher turnover. Schools serving poor children 
traditionally have more difficulty hiring and retaining highly-qualified teachers than those in 
more affluent areas (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2007, Jackson 2009).24  If the bonus program 
increased the supply of qualified teachers willing to work at treatment schools or reduced 
turnover, it could have effects on student achievement in the long run. However, consistent with 
our other findings, , the bonus program did not reduce either type of turnover (Table 6 Panel A) 
or the characteristics of new hires, as measured by the percent with a masters degree and the 
percent with prior teaching experience (Table 6, Panel B).  
 
7 Conclusion 
 The conditional random assignment of eligibility for the school-wide bonus program in 
New York City offers a great opportunity to learn about the impact of group-based incentives on 
schools, teachers, and students. Interestingly, we find little evidence that the bonus program had 
any effect on student test scores in either the first or second years of the program, nor did it lead 
to significant behavioral changes, as measured by student and teacher surveys, teacher absences, 
teacher turnover, or the selection of new teachers. While we find suggestive evidence of a small 
reduction in teacher absences in schools where teachers had relatively strong incentives to 
increase their effort, we also find some evidence that students in the lowest portion of the test 
score distribution were negatively impacted by the program.  
In general, prior studies have found that teacher incentive pay enhances student 
achievement and other desirable outcomes.  However, our results underscore the fact that the 
structure of performance pay and the setting in which it is implemented may be very important in 
determining its effects. On one hand, we find some evidence that a group-based compensation 
scheme led to free-riding among teachers with no discernable short-run benefits for students. On 
the other, in schools where the incentives for individual teachers are strongest, there is evidence 
that teachers do increase effort by reducing absenteeism. It is important to note that the size of 
the bonuses offered in the New York City program were not small – constituting around five 
percent of teacher salaries – compared with programs studied elsewhere. For example, in the 
                                                 
24 In a given year, approximately 10 percent of NYC teachers leave the city while an additional 8 percent switch 
schools within the city. 
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program that Lavy (2002) examines, which offered group incentives to teachers within schools, 
bonuses were also equivalent to five percent of a teacher’s starting salary.  Thus, it is unlikely 
that the lack of any significant impacts is due to the size of potential bonuses. Indeed, the city 
spent $14 million providing bonuses after the first year of the program, and, as student test scores 
in New York City rose in 2009, it will likely spend an equal or greater amount in the program’s 
second year. The results of this paper suggest that students may benefit from a restructuring of 
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Number of Schools 185 162 640
Average enrollment 560 548 690
Average enrollment, tested grades 359 364 450
Fraction elementary school 62% * 51% 60%
Fraction middle school 26% * 38% 28%
Fraction K-8 school 12%  11% 12%
School Accountability Outcomes
Peer index (mean = 0, sd = 1) -0.90 -0.93 0.50
Overall accountability score 52.8 51.6 54.5
Student Characteristics
Average math scale score (2007) 656 ** 651 677
Change in math scale score (2006 to 2007) 10.6 10.3 8.8
Average reading scale score (2007) 640 + 638 661
Change in reading scale score (2006 to 2007) 1.5 * 3.0 3.1
Fraction English Language Learner 19% 19% 10%
Fraction special education 12% 13% 9%
Fraction free lunch 88% 89% 62%
Fraction Hispanic 56% 53% 32%
Fraction Black 41% 43% 30%
Fraction White 1% 1% 20%
Teacher Characteristics
Number of teachers 55 54 59
Number of teachers, tested classrooms 12 13 14
Average years of experience 7.8 7.8 8.4
Fraction with masters degree 50% ** 47% 47%
Average absences (2007) 4.1 * 3.8 3.7
Average absences, tested classrooms (2007) 4.2 4.1 3.8
Fraction teachers not retained by DOE (2007) 12% 12% 9%
Fraction teachers changing schools (2007) 7% 8% 5%
Fraction of new teachers TFA volunteer 12% 13% 3%
Fraction of new teachers Teaching Fellow 26% 24% 19%
Fraction of new teachers with MA 35% 36% 41%
Fraction of new teachers with prior experience 27% 30% 36%
Treatment 
Schools
Notes: Characteristics measured at beginning of 2007-2008 school year unless otherwise noted; + difference between 
treatment and control significant at 10%, * 5%, ** 1%; average absences measured between November 2006 and 
March 2007.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable
Math Scale Score -0.644 -0.710 -0.432 -0.650 -0.665 -0.751
(0.530) (0.519) (0.520) (0.478) (0.468) (0.486)
Reading Scale Score -0.158 -0.284 -0.270 -0.129 -0.179 -0.232
(0.474) (0.446) (0.458) (0.332) (0.327) (0.335)
Observations 347 347 330 343 343 326
Additional controls X X X X
Outliers dropped X X
Notes: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; robust standard errors 
in parentheses; each cell denotes a separate regression; all regressions control for prior 
(2007) scale score; additional controls include: school level,  peer index, overall 
accountability score, percentage of students ELL, special education, free lunch recipients, 
and student race (African American and Hispanic), columns (3) and (6) drop schools in 
bottom 5% of peer index, all regressions weighted by number of students tested.
2007-2008 2008-2009
Table 2: Impact of Teacher Incentives on Student Academic Achievement
(1) (2) (3)
A. Student Survey Outcomes




Tutoring Offered 0.061 0.078 0.092
Before/After School (0.133) (0.139) (0.139)
Observations 159 159 143
B. Teacher Survey Outcomes
Use of Student Data -0.034 -0.053 -0.043
(0.098) (0.099) (0.098)
Quality of Professional 0.076 0.069 0.081
Development (0.098) (0.099) (0.099)
High Expectations -0.106 -0.132 -0.126
(0.092) (0.086) (0.085)
Observations 347 347 330
Additional controls X X
Outliers dropped X
Notes: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%; robust standard errors in parentheses; each cell denotes a 
separate regression; all regressions control for prior (2007) 
survey outcome; additional controls include: school level,  peer 
index, overall accountability score, percentage of students ELL, 
special education, free lunch recipients, and student race (African 
American and Hispanic), column (3) drops schools in bottom 5% 
of peer index, all regressions weighted by number of survey 
respondents.
Group & Hands-on 
Learning Activities
Table 3: Impact of Teacher Incentives on Student and 
Teacher Survey Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. All Teachers
Treatment 0.067 0.069 0.058
(0.085) (0.088) (0.089)
Observations 347 347 330
B. Teachers with Tested Students
Treatment 0.003 0.009 0.023 -0.127 -0.126 -0.138
(0.140) (0.143) (0.146) (0.135) (0.137) (0.138)
-0.007 -0.011 -0.008
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
* Treatment 0.054 0.053 0.053
(0.023)* (0.023)* (0.025)*
Observations 320 320 305 320 320 292
Additional controls X X X X
Outliers dropped X X
Notes: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; each column within Panels A and B denotes 
a separate regression; in columns (4) through (6) the number of teachers with tested students is demeaned; all 
regressions control for prior absences; additional controls include: school level, peer index, overall accountability 
score, percentage of students ELL, special education, free lunch recipients, and student race (African American 
and Hispanic), columns (3) and (6) drop schools in bottom 5% of peer index; regressions are unweighted; schools 
with no teachers linked to tested students are dropped in Panel B regressions.
Number of teachers with 
tested students (mean = 0)
Table 4: Impact of Teacher Incentives on Absences taken for Personal and Sick Leave, 
November 2007 through March 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment * ELL or Special Education -0.218 -0.229 0.281 -0.595 -0.511 -0.434
(0.861) (0.828) (0.829) (0.796) (0.766) (0.789)
Treatment * Lowest 3rd -1.409 -1.330 -1.096 -0.432 -0.370 -0.246
(0.768)+ (0.751)+ (0.760) (0.645) (0.614) (0.630)
Treatment * Middle 3rd -0.810 -0.796 -0.501 -0.128 -0.182 -0.082
(0.642) (0.630) (0.636) (0.515) (0.481) (0.495)
Treatment * Highest 3rd -0.943 -0.937 -0.584 -0.451 -0.467 -0.469
(0.720) (0.703) (0.715) (0.650) (0.572) (0.588)
Observations 1372 1372 1308 1368 1368 1308
Additional Controls X X X X
Outliers Dropped X X
Math Scale Score Reading Scale Score
Notes: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; robust standard errors in parentheses; each column 
denotes a separate regression; all regressions control for prior year (2007) scale score; additional controls include: school 
level,  peer index, overall accountability score, percentage of students receiving free lunch, and student race (African 
American and Hispanic); columns (3) and (6) drop schools in bottom 5% of peer index , all regressions weighted by 
group size.
Table 5: Heterogeneity in the Impact of Teacher Incentives on Student Academic Achievement by 
Prior Year Achievement and ELL/Special Education Status
(1) (2) (3)





Observations 343 343 326
B. Characteristics of New Teachers, 2009
0.000 0.005 0.010
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Fraction of new teachers with MA 0.039 0.033 0.033
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Fraction of new teachers with -0.004 -0.006 -0.007
prior teaching experience (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Observations 292 292 279
Additional controls X X
Outliers dropped X
Table 6: The Impact of Teacher Incentives on Teacher Turnover 
and the Qualifications of New Teachers 
Notes: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; robust 
standard errors in parentheses; each column with Panels A and B denotes a 
separate regression; Panel A regressions control for prior (2007-2008) 
fraction of teachers not retained or fraction of teachers leaving for another 
school; Panel B regressions control for prior (2008) outcome; additional 
controls include: school level,  peer index, overall accountability score, 
percentage of students ELL, special education, free lunch recipients, and 
student race (African American and Hispanic), column (3) drops schools in 
bottom 5% of peer index, all regressions weighted by number of teacher 
(panel A) or number of new teachers (panel B); schools without new teacher 
hires dropped from Panel B regressions. 
Fraction of teachers not retained by 
school district 
Fraction of teachers leaving for 
another NYC school
Fraction of new teachers who are 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Reading Scale Scores by Year and Treatment Status 
 
Table A1: Baseline Characteristics of Treatment Schools by Vote
Voted 
"Yes"
Number of Schools 25 160
Average enrollment 573 558
Average enrollment, tested grades 333 377
Fraction elementary school 0.72 0.60
Fraction middle school 0.08 0.13
Fraction K-8 school 0.20 0.28
School Accountability Outcomes
Peer index (mean = 0, sd = 1) -0.86 -0.91
Overall accountability score 56.2 52.3
Student Characteristics
Average math scale score (2007) 662 * 655
Change in math scale score (2006 to 2007) 10.2 10.6
Average reading scale score (2007) 645 * 640
Change in reading scale score (2006 to 2007) 53% 170%
Fraction English Language Learner 18% 20%
Fraction special education 12% 12%
Fraction free lunch 88% 88%
Fraction Hispanic 57% 56%
Fraction Black 38% 41%
Fraction White 1% 1%
Teacher Characteristics
Number of Teachers 55 54
Number of teachers, tested classrooms 13 12
Average years of experience 8.2 7.7
Fraction with masters degree 50% 49%
Average absences (2007) 3.9 4.1
Average absences, tested classrooms (2007) 4.3 4.2
Fraction teachers not retained by DOE (2007) 11% 12%
Fraction teachers changing schools (2007) 7% 7%
Fraction of new teachers TFA volunteer 8% 12%
Fraction of new teachers Teaching Fellow 20% 27%
Fraction of new teachers with MA 41% 34%
Fraction of new teachers with prior experience 38% * 25%
Notes: Characteristics measured at beginning of 2007-2008 school year unless otherwise 
noted; + difference between treatment and control significant at 10%, * 5%, ** 1%; average 





Percentage of tested students ELL -0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 290 290 276
Percentage of tested students -0.003 0.000 0.000
special education (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 322 322 308
Reading
Percentage of tested students ELL -0.001 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)+
Observations 284 284 270
Percentage of tested students -0.002 0.001 0.002
special education (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 322 322 308
Additional controls X X
Outliers excluded X
Notes: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; robust 
standard errors in parentheses; each cell denotes a separate regression; all 
regressions control for prior (2007) percentage ELL or special education; additional 
controls include: school level, peer index, overall accountability score, percentage 
of students ELL , special education , free lunch recipients, and student race (African 
American and Hispanic), columns (3) and (6) drop schools in bottom 5% of peer 
index, all regressions weighted by number of students tested.
Table A2: Program Impacts on Percentage of Tested Students Classified as 
English Language Learner or Special Education, by Subject
